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Abstract
This article discusses the out-of-court restructuring of the contractual
obligations of a financially distressed firm, under conditions of asymmetric
information among the firm’s creditors and in situations where a creditor
bank makes concessions conditional on other creditors’ actions. I show
that a bank’s conditional commitment to support the financially distressed
firm may inject a degree of strategic solidity among other creditors and
reduce the deadweight costs of ineﬃcient liquidation. However, should a
bank’s concession be made conditional on a high tendering rate by other
creditors, this may negate the positive information externality of bank’s
action. Low minimum tendering rates, on the other hand, may lead to
multiple equilibria in creditors’ strategies; but, all those equilibria are
shown to be Pareto improving of the unique equilibrium when there is no
bank in the game.
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1 Introduction
Empirical evidence suggests that banks play a potentially important role in
facilitating the resolution of financial distress. Inspired by Corsetti et al (2001),
one possible explanation for this is that the actions of large creditors, such as
banks, simply allow small creditors to co-ordinate more eﬃciently. In particular,
if a bank lender chooses to restructure, this may be taken by smaller, possibly
less informed creditors such as public debt holders or suppliers, to imply that
the going concern value of the firm, and thus the value of new claims oﬀered,
exceeds the liquidation value of the firm. In this way, we could argue that
banks and other large well-informed creditors act to facilitate the resolution of
financial distress by injecting a degree of strategic solidity in credit markets.
In the literature, there has been no theoretical work directed at examining
this proposition. Rather, this has tended to concentrate mainly on firms’ op-
timal choices between public and private debt, and the agency and other costs
associated with diﬀused versus concentrated ownership of debt when the firm is
out of financial distress. This is despite a steady accumulation of empirical work
that has examined the role of banks in facilitating public debt exchange oﬀers
(out-of-court resolution of financial distress) when creditors face co-ordination
problems and banks are assumed to own some proprietary, though not neces-
sarily superior, information about the going concern value of the firm.
Mooradian and Ryan (2003) examine cases of out-of-court restructuring of
debt and the resolution of financial distress under Section 3(a)(9) of the U.S.
Security Act and compare them to investment-bank-managed exchange oﬀers.
They find evidence that when a commercial bank makes a concession — which
is almost always conditioned on a successful public debt restructuring — the
importance of the exchange oﬀer increases and an investment bank is more
likely to be involved. Their results suggest that investment banks play a very
important role in certifying the exchange and facilitating debt reduction, but
unlike commercial banks, they play little if any role in resolving co-ordination
problems.
James (1995, 1996) finds evidence consistent with the hypothesis that bank
participation in debt restructuring transactions facilitates public debt exchange
oﬀers. In particular, he finds evidence that forgiveness of principal by banks
induces public-debt holders to accept a debt exchange oﬀer more easily and
to reduce principal more aggressively1. Also the likelihood of achieving mini-
mum tendering rates - which is a typical prerequisite in debt exchange oﬀers -
increases2. He further finds evidence that transactions in which banks forgive
principal typically involve firms with more severe financial distress (e.g. higher
leverage), which suggests that banks make concessions only when their claims
are likely to be impaired. James (1996) also reports that, in all cases where
1 In fifteen debt restructuring transactions where banks took no action the average reduction
in public debt was 19%, while in 14 cases where the bank reduced principle the average
reduction in public debt was 56%.
2 In all cases where banks oﬀer to scale down their loans actual tendering rates are above
the minimum specified for success compared to 30% when banks do not make concessions.
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banks make concessions, they make their oﬀers contingent upon the successful
completion of the public debt exchange oﬀer.
Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) analyse how financially distressed
firms try to avoid bankruptcy through public/private debt restructuring, asset
sales, mergers and capital expenditure reductions. Using a sample of companies
with high-yield, junk bond issues with financial diﬃculties, they find evidence
that the firm’s debt structure aﬀects the way financially distressed firms re-
structure their claims. In particular, a combination of secured private debt and
numerous public debt issues seems to impede out-of-court restructuring and the
firm’s debt structure aﬀects the way financially distressed firms restructure their
claims.
In contrast to James (1996), Asquith et al (1994) find that banks almost
never loosen financial constraints by forgiving principal, while loosening finan-
cial constraints does not reduce the probability of bankruptcy3. They argue,
however, that their sample is very specific as it focuses on the high-yield bond
market, and the results should not be generalised. Gilson, Kose and Lang (1990)
find evidence that the likelihood of out-of-court debt restructuring is positively
related to the firm’s reliance on bank debt.
In the theoretical front, Bolton and Freixas (2000) discuss a model of corpo-
rate finance where both supply and demand influence the availability of finance
within an equilibrium set-up with asymmetric information. They argue that
banks can help firms in times of distress because they can exploit their supe-
rior information/borrower screening skills. In addition, an important feature of
their model is banks’ ability to securitise senior portions of rescue finance they
extend to firms in distress (e.g. in a debtor-in-pocession situation) and avoid
the incentive to liquidate ineﬃciently a firm in financial distress. In equilibrium,
banks choose to increase their supply of loans, provided that they can price ef-
fectively for the extra risk and they are not capital constrained. That way bank
loans may substitute for other forms of finance and facilitate the resolution of
financial distress.
Diamond (1993) argues that, because bank lenders are generally secured,
they have little incentive to make concessions. Gertner and Scharfstein (1991)
provide a model that illustrates how bank participation in the restructuring
transaction can mitigate holdout problems among public debt-holders. In do-
ing so, however, they assume common knowledge about the firm’s economic
fundamentals which allows perfect co-ordination of creditors’ actions.
Jaﬀee and Shleifer (1990) examine how investment banks protect firms from
financial distress due to self-fulfilling failure of calls of convertible bonds. They
provide an analogy to Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) bank runs model by arguing
that, by underwriting the forced conversion of convertible bonds, investment
banks essentially provide insurance (a put option) to the firm in the same way
that deposit insurance provides protection against bank runs.
3 59% of firms whose banks loosen financial constraints still went bankrupt vs. 68% of
the firms whose banks tighten the constraints, though there are diﬀerences in restructuring
periods until bankruptcy.
3
Yet Jaﬀee and Shleifer assume that the economic fundamentals of the firm
i.e. the value of firm’s assets, is common knowledge among creditors and there
is no uncertainty about equilibrium behaviour of creditors. This allows per-
fect co-ordination of creditors’ actions and results in multiple Nash equilibria4.
Moreover, it implies that there is only risk shifting from the firm to the bank
and there is no information content in an investment bank’s action to accept
the underwriting. It is exactly that information content that is central to our
analysis.
Giammarino (1989) models the resolution of financial distress under Chapter
11 proceedings as a non-cooperative game of incomplete information played by
a firm and a single creditor. He considers a model of financial distress of a
firm with equity entirely owned by a single risk-neutral individual and debt
outstanding which is entirely owned by a perfectly co-ordinated group of risk-
neutral debt-holders. He shows that, despite the possibility of costless, out-of-
court reorganisation, it may be rational for firms to incur significant financial
costs in the resolution of financial distress due to the existence of asymmetric
information and judicial discretion.
In this paper, we consider an out-of-court renegotiation of contractual oblig-
ations in a setting that is similar to a debt exchange oﬀer, where a firm, a bank
creditor and a continuum of small claimants to the firm interact in an environ-
ment of asymmetric information about the firm’s solvency condition. Solvency
condition is defined with respect to the ability of the firm to repay all its con-
tractual obligations after the completion of a risky project that currently has
in place. We investigate the extent to which acceptance by the bank to commit
further funds to the firm (e.g. via a new loan), facilitates contract revision oﬀers
by other creditors5 .
In our model, the bank is a large creditor by virtue of its non-negligible
financial mass, while individual small creditors are assumed to be of measure
zero. In that sense, the game is asymmetric. Although the size of the bank can
be small, compared to the balance sheet of the financially distressed firm, and
insuﬃcient just by itself to manufacture a bail-out of the firm, its size is not of
zero measure. Moreover, the actions by the bank are assumed to be common
knowledge among other creditors before they choose their own actions. In that
sense, the game is sequential. Consequently, in equilibrium, the bank recognises
both the information and the money-eﬀect of its own action, while individual
small creditors fail to see those eﬀects in isolation and can only consider their
impact as a whole.
Throughout the paper, we assume that a bank creditor has an information
advantage over other creditors. This is consistent with the literature on the
importance of banks’ monitoring abilities and how banks might get access to
better information compared to other types of creditors6. In particular, we focus
4For a discussion on this issue see Morris and Shin (2000)
5Hereinafter, the words claimants and creditors may be used interchangeably.
6That literature includes, among others, Bolton and Freixas (1998, 2000), Holmstrom and
Tirole (1997), Houston and James (1996), Rajan (1992), Lummer and McConnell (1989),
Fama (1985), to mention but a few.
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on the limited case where the relative precision of small claimants’ information
relative to that of the bank tends to zero. This is without loss of generality and
it is necessary for maintaining tractability in our analysis and deriving a closed
form solution for equilibrium strategies7.
The basic feature of our analysis is that agents in the model exhibit full
strategic complementarities. That is, the expected payoﬀ to an agent from un-
dertaking a certain action increases the higher the proportion of other agents
that undertake the same action. This allows us to use the methods of Carlsson
and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (2002) on global games and to focus
on equilibrium trigger strategies around critical levels of agents private informa-
tion (signals). Given full strategic complementarities, those trigger strategies
can be shown to be the only dominant solvable equilibrium strategies of the
restructuring game that we consider. Yet, an innovation of the model that adds
to the existing literature on global games is that we introduce conditionality in
the actions by one class of players — in particular, by the bank — conditional on
the actions that are taken by the other class, namely the small claimants.
The analysis shows that a bank, by accepting to extend further credit to a
firm in financial distress conditional upon acceptance of a contract revision oﬀer
by some proportion of small claimants, it may inject a degree of strategic solidity
in credit markets and facilitate the resolution of financial distress. This result
is consistent with empirical evidence that shows that acceptance by a bank to
commit further to a financially distressed firm facilitates contract revision oﬀers
to other creditors (e.g. James 1995,1996). In particular, we show that con-
tract revision oﬀers become successful at lower levels of firm’s fundamentals8
compared to the situation where the bank has no role to play in the debt re-
structuring, controlling for money-eﬀects. This implies, lower deadweight costs
of ineﬃcient liquidation when a bank is in the game compared to the situation
where there is no bank in the game.
The intuition that underlies the above proposition is that, in large-scale
debt renegotiations, which typically involve the restructuring of both public
and private claims, the actions taken by banks are usually observable and a
bank’s response to a debt renegotiation can influence, to a greater or lesser
extent, the equilibrium strategies of other creditors through two diﬀerent paths:
First, through the non-zero financial mass of the bank and the non-negligible
amount of funds it is able to extend/rollover. Second, even controlling for
money-eﬀects, a bank’s involvement may aﬀect the beliefs of other creditors
regarding the fundamentals of the financially distressed entity in a way that
induces a more eﬃcient outcome of the debt renegotiation.
Moreover, a bank, by accepting a restructuring oﬀer conditional upon accep-
tance of the debt exchange oﬀer by a minimum proportion of public debt holders
(minimum tendering rate), may allow both itself and other creditors to make
better informed decisions. This is, conditional oﬀers may permit aggregation
7 In a similar setting, Corsetti et al (2001) show numerically that the direction of results is
robust to any level of relative precision of agents’ private information.
8For our purposes, fundamentals of the firm are defined with respect to the cash generating
power of the firm’s project upon its completion.
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of individual information and allow individual creditors to base their actions
on the collective wisdom of other creditors. However, we show that the posi-
tive signaling eﬀect of a bank’s concession to rollover its credit to a financially
distressed firm, may be undermined should that consent be made conditional
upon acceptance of a restructuring oﬀer by a relatively high proportion of small
creditors. In other words, excessive conditionality, in the form of high minimum
tendering rates, may negate the positive information externality of a bank’s
acceptance on the decisions of other creditors. This is regardless of our basic
assumption that the relative precision of small claimants’ information relative
to that of the bank tends to zero.
On the theoretical front, we also derive an important result that relates
to equilibrium implications of conditionality on creditors’ strategies: We find
that, for relatively low levels of conditionality (e.g. low minimum tendering
rates), there are multiple equilibria in trigger strategies that are followed by the
bank and small creditors. More specifically, for low conditionality levels, there
is a one-to-one mapping from bank’s trigger strategies to those followed by
small creditors and vice versa. Moreover, we demonstrate that a bank’s trigger
strategy becomes a strictly decreasing function of the strategy that is followed
by other creditors, which implies that high equilibrium trigger strategies by
one class of creditors is good news for the other class, which then choose to
follow a low trigger strategy in equilibrium. However, under relatively high
conditionality levels, there is a unique equilibrium in small creditors’ strategies
that does not depend on the strategy that is followed by the bank. The bank’s
strategy, then, is defined uniquely as a function of the small claimants’ unique
trigger strategy.
However, the above theoretical result does not lead to indeterminacy regard-
ing the role of banks in the resolution of financial distress. In fact, all multiple
equilibria that may result from a bank’s conditional involvement in a debt rene-
gotiation are shown to be Pareto improving compared to the unique equilibrium
that we derive when a bank is not in the game. In other words, all equilibria
under a bank’s involvement imply resolution of financial distressed at lower lev-
els of firm’s fundamentals compared to the situation where there is no bank in
the game, which then implies lower deadweight costs of ineﬃcient liquidation.
Throughout this paper we adopt a fairly generic characterisation of the fi-
nancially distressed entity and we do not make any specific reference to the
ownership structure of that entity, the role for equity capital, or potential con-
flict of interests between shareholders and bondholders in the spirit of Jensen
and Meckling (1976). Thus, our analysis by-passes possible conflicts of interest
between diﬀerent classes of security holders and concentrates on the workouts
of financial distress, the potential ineﬃciencies that may arise from creditors’
co-ordination problems and how those ineﬃciencies can be alleviated via the in-
volvement of a bank creditor. Consequently, our analysis does not allow for the
simultaneous treatment of both co-ordination problems among creditors, when
the firm is in financial distress, and potential moral-hazard problems associated
with the terms of lending at origination, when the debtor is out of financial
distress. This, however, is a subject that we consider for future research.
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The generic characterisation of the firm’s balance sheet allows us to add
some thoughts that stretch beyond the resolution of financial distress in the
corporate sector and relate to the resolution of international financial crisis. In
particular, we could draw a parallel between the balance sheet of the financially
distressed firm in our model, and the capital account of a country during the
onset of financial crisis. We could then discuss implications of our model for
the doctrine of catalytic finance and the scope and rationale for IMF lending
to a debtor country when that country faces a situation, or the possibility, of
financial distress.
In September 2003, for example, the Brazilian government has authorised the
negotiation of a new, one-year deal with the IMF. The government’s Treasury
secretary, Joaquim Levy, was then quoted as saying9
...Obviously, our objective is to walk alone and not
depend on the fund. But a one-year renewal could
be an important mechanism of information to
investors who did not follow Brazil’s progress closely.
The above statement is striking given the strong criticism of the IMF by
president da Silva for more than twenty years in opposition. But, it also suggests
that there is possibly something more than money in the involvement of the
IMF in the resolution of financial distress. Namely, IMF lending may act as a
mechanism of information that permits less informed — and possibly small —
creditors to co-ordinate more eﬃciently. This is consistent with the result of
our paper that large, informed creditors may act as gate keepers to the system
and, should debtors’ fundamentals justify it, inject a degree of strategic solidity
among other creditors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses
the model. The solution proceeds in steps in sections 3, 4 and 5. Section
6 concludes and adds some thoughts on possible implications for the role of
catalytic finance in the resolution of international financial crisis. Proofs of our
results are included in the appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a three-period setting {τ = 0, 1, 2} in which a firm with a risky
project, a large creditor and a continuum of small claimants (suppliers) to the
firm interact in an environment of asymmetric information. To model strategic
interactions among agents we use the methods of Carlsson and van Damme
(1993) on global games as applied by Morris and Shin (2000, 2001), Rochet and
Vives (2001) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2000).
Instead of focusing explicitly on debt exchange oﬀers to a diﬀuse set of
public-debt holders, we consider the case where a set of asymmetrically in-
formed suppliers to the firm are asked, through a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, to
9FT, September 12, 2003.
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make concessions about the timing of their payment and the delivery of inputs
to the firm. This assumption is without loss of generality and, as it will become
clear latter, it is made solely in order to simplify agents’ payoﬀ functions.
2.1 Agents
There are three types of risk-neutral agents: the firm’s owners (the firm) that
run a risky project, the firm’s banker (the bank), whose financial resources are
limited, and a continuum of firm’s non-equity stakeholders (suppliers). At date
τ = 0 the firm has equity capital E and long-term secured bank debt (loan)
with face value B and maturity at τ = 2. The firm also signs identical contracts
with the suppliers that promise to deliver inputs for the project at date τ = 110 .
Inputs are project-specific and if suppliers will not deliver at date τ = 1 they
have to sell the inputs at a discount elsewhere. We also assume that at τ = 1
the firm has a number of obligations to other parties (e.g. employes) of total
amount equal to C.
2.2 Investment
Initial investments are made at date τ = 0 when the bank loan (B) and equity
capital (E) are used to finance firm’s liquid asset reserves (L) and firm’s invest-
ment (I0) in an illiquid risky project. At date τ = 0 the firm also places orders
to the suppliers for an aggregate quantity Q of inputs with payment taking
place upon delivery at τ = 1. Firm and suppliers agree on a price per unit of
inputs produced equal to unity11.
Bank-debt is held by a large well-informed bank while supply contracts are
signed by a diﬀuse set of small, poorly informed suppliers. The bank is a
large creditor by virtue of the face value of the loans it extends to the firm
compared with the individual credit lines extended by non-equity stakeholders
which individually are considered negligible as a proportion of the whole (i.e.
of measure zero).
At date τ = 1 the firm requires a minimum quantity of new inputs rQ
(where, 0 < r < 1) in order for the project to reach its final stage and generate
a return
³ eR´ at date τ = 2. Otherwise the project must be abandoned and the
firm is liquidated.
The minimum proportion of inputs (r) that has to be delivered in order for
the project to continue could be interpreted as the minimum tendering rate in
a debt exchange oﬀer if instead of suppliers we were considering a continuum of
public debt holders (e.g. short-term commercial paper investors). The quantity
(1− r) could also be regarded as the maximum contraction of firm’s operations
before the firm becomes unable to operate as a going concern.
10As in Berlin and Saunders (1996) our setting assumes suppliers cannot be paid up front.
11Although we do not intend to derive explicitly the optimal loan level and quantity of
inputs agreed to be supplied, the liability structure of the firm allows us to capture strategic
interactions between the claimants of the firm.
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Moreover, at τ = 1 the firm needs an amount of cash (C) in order to cover
a number of necessary operating expenses (e.g. labour costs). Failure to meet
those obligations at τ = 1 would result in severe disruption of firm’s operations,
abandonment of the project and liquidation.
We distinguish between insolvency and illiquidity by defining solvency in
terms of firm’s ability to meet its contractual obligations at the final date (τ = 2)
out of project’s payoﬀ. We adopt the following definition:
Definition 1 At date τ = 1 the firm is considered to be solvent if and only if it
is considered capable of meeting all its contractual obligations (i.e. both to the
bank and to the diﬀuse set of claimants) at the final date (τ = 2) .
Now, let (L) be the book value of the firm’s liquid assets at date τ = 0. This
implies the following accounting identity.
I0 + L = B +E
As of date τ = 0, the liquidation value
³eL´ of firm’s liquid assets at the
intermediate date (τ = 1) is a random variable with the following probability
distribution: eL = ½ LH w.p. p
LL w.p. 1− p
where, subscripts H and L stand for high and low respectively and LH >
Q + C and LL ≤ Q + C. In other words, 1 − p is the ex-ante probability of
financial distress at the intermediate date12 . In this model liquidity shocks are
considered exogenous and relate to the marketability of firm’s liquid assets (e.g.
due to general market conditions).
At date τ = 1 the firm has to pay its suppliers (Q) and cover its operating
expenses (C). Firm’s liquid asset reserves can then be used as a means for
payment. The liquidation value of the project is small relative to the size of
the firm’s balance sheet and we normalise it to zero. In case of liquidation, we
assume that priority rules are enforced for secured lenders. As of date τ = 1,
supply contracts may be cancelled (foreclosed) at a cost (c) should the firm claim
that it is unable to pay the initially agreed price per unit of supplied inputs13.
This formulation is in line with Berlin et al (1996)14.
12Assuming common knowledge of the parameters, a necessary condition for investment to
take place at the initial date is:
pLH + (1− p)LL > Q+ C
13We proceed by assuming that the claim, by the firm, that it faces liquidity problems is
truthful and reveals the fact that L = LL. In other words, there is no gaming from the firm
in order to extract value from its creditors.
14Berlin et al (1996) consider a similar situation, yet, with a perfectly co-ordinated set of
suppliers, where suppliers may choose to terminate an established supply relationship with a
firm should that relationship be severed by the firm.
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3 The Problem
We impose the following structure on the problem. At date τ = 1 the firm is in
financial distress (i.e. L = LL) and has not enough resources to pay in full its
suppliers (Q) and to cover its operating costs (C). Moreover, we assume that
the liquidation value of firm’s financial slack is not even enough to repay in full
its debt to the bank (B) in case of acceleration of debt at τ = 1 (i.e. LL < B).
For notational convenience and without loss of generality we set LL = 0. The
firm is also unable to raise money by selling new securities to outside investors.
Yet, the firm needs at least proportion (r) of the aggregate input quantity
(Q) and an amount of cash equal C in order to meet its operating costs and
continue with the project until the final period. In order to avoid liquidation





in the form of senior unsecured loan. Should the
bank agree to provide the new loan the firm also has to oﬀer a new contract to
its suppliers in exchange of the old one. The exchange oﬀer should allow the
firm to receive the necessary amount of inputs in order to carry on with the
project
3.1 The Debt Restructuring Oﬀer
The debt restructuring oﬀer by the firm takes the form of a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer. The oﬀers to suppliers are identical and provide the delivery of inputs at
date τ = 1 in exchange of an unsecured debt claim to the firm payable at τ = 2
(e.g. bill of trade, promissory note etc.) for every unit of inputs delivered. The
debt claims are payable at τ = 2 and each one has a face value equal to αs. In
order to deal with hold out problems we assume that αs > 1.
Definition 2 The renegotiation of supply contacts is considered successful if
and only if at least proportion r of firm’s suppliers accept to deliver at τ = 1 in
exchange of unsecured debt claims payable at τ = 2.
We assume that suppliers’ responses to the contract revision oﬀer are pooled
together and inputs are released in exchange of debt contracts only if the rene-
gotiation of supply contracts is successful15 .
Moreover, in line with empirical evidence (James (1996)), we assume that
acceptance by the bank to extend new credit is made contingent upon successful
completion of the renegotiation of supply contracts. In other words, a necessary
condition for the bank to extend the new loan and for tendering suppliers to
deliver the inputs is that a minimum proportion (r) of suppliers accept the new
contract terms.
15An alternative interpretation of the contract revision oﬀer is to consider it a debt exchange
oﬀer to a diﬀuse set of public debt holders with minimum tendering rate r. The Trust Indenture
Act of 1939 prohibits any change in the timing or amount of public debt payments and forces
public debt restructurings to take the form of exchange oﬀers. Under debt exchange oﬀers
firms oﬀer new claims to debt holders that accept to tender with the oﬀer typically made
contingent on the acceptance of a minimum proportion of the public debt (see, for example,
Gertner and Scharfstein (1991)).
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3.2 Bank’s Payoﬀ Function
At date τ = 1 the firm has no collateral to oﬀer but both the old and the new
loan to the firm rank first in the firm’s capital structure. Yet, if the bank rejects
the oﬀer then the firm will be liquidated immediately (e.g. under Chapter 7
proceedings). In that case, the seniority of the old claim to the firm is of no
value given that the claim is severely impaired (actually is worthless) due to
zero liquidation value of the firm at τ = 1. Given also that bank’s agreement to
extend new credit to the firm is made conditional upon successful completion of
the exchange oﬀer to suppliers, the loss that the bank will incur if default takes
place at τ = 1 is limited only to the old loan amount (B) . In case of default
at τ = 2 the bank has the first claim on what the project has generated up to
the total loan amount (B +C). Yet, if there is no default at all, the bank fully
recovers both the new and the old loan amount (B +C). The following table
summarises the bank’s loss function under diﬀerent scenarios:
Bank Default at τ = 1 Default at τ = 2 No Default
Accept -B -LGD × (B +C) 0
Reject -B - -
where, LGD is the loss-given-default (e.g. internal-systems-based) associ-
ated with the situation where there is default at τ = 216. For convenience we
assume that -LGD × (B + C) < −B, or that LGD > BB+C . This assumption
intends to capture the non-trivial nature of bank’s commitment to extend new
credit at τ = 1. This is, the amount of new credit C is not negligible compared
with the original amount B. Moreover, banks usually claim that it is their
policy when they extend credit to make sure that the firm is solvent. In other
words, the provision of extra security (i.e. enhanced seniority, collateral etc.)
other than aﬀecting the terms of lending it is not the driving force behind bank’s
decision to extend credit or not. As a result, it would be conceptually wrong,
on an ex-ante basis, to relate explicitly the bank’s payoﬀ in case of default at
τ = 2 to the firm’s liquidation value. This would obstruct us from the original
objective which is to capture the eﬀect of bank’s belief about the solvency status
of the firm on small claimants’ actions. Furthermore, it would computationally
burden our analysis making it very specific to distributional assumptions about
agents’ signals17.
3.3 Suppliers’ Contingent Payoﬀs
We assume that inputs are project-specific and if suppliers choose not to de-
liver at date τ = 1 they have to sell the inputs at a discount (c) elsewhere18.
16The use of a fixed LGD is consistent with the foundations internal-ratings-based IRB
approach that has been proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The IRB
approach requires banks to assign a fixed LGD figure to particular classes of credit exposures.
17Even the uniqueness of trigger strategy equilibrium could be lost.
18We use that assumption in order to avoid the complication of explicitly building the term
structure of credit spreads into the model or arbitrarily assume a gross rate of return (r > 1)
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Rochet and Vives (2001) use a similar formulation where they interpret a fixed
foreclosure cost (c) as a reputation cost of fund managers due to bad judgement.
Such an interpretation would be applicable to our model should instead of a
continuum of suppliers we would assume a continuum of unsecured creditors
(e.g. short-term commercial paper investors).
We also assume that, on an ex-ante basis, suppliers expect to receive a small
fixed payoﬀ (l) in case of default and liquidation of the firm at τ = 2. For
simplicity we set that contingent payoﬀ equal to zero19. This assumption is
without loss of generality, although one could argue that suppliers’ expected
pay-oﬀ conditional on default at τ = 2 should be determined endogenously
as a function of the proportion of suppliers that accept the oﬀer. Yet, this
would bring undue complication in the model given that what we intend to
capture is suppliers’ incentives to avoid the cost of not selling their inputs to the
monopsonist firm, or of extending credit to an insolvent firm. This assumption
is also consistent with empirical evidence. White (1983), for example, observes
that unsecured creditors receive little or no payoﬀ in liquidation20. He also
argues that some unsecured claims such as trade creditor claims are generally
not covered by subordination agreements and rank at the bottom of the seniority
ranking.
If there is no default both at τ = 1 and τ = 2, suppliers not only recover the
originally contracted amount per unit of inputs supplied, but also a premium
(i.e.αs − 1)above that amount. Given the above, suppliers’ loss function looks
as follows:
Suppliers Default at τ = 1 Default at τ = 2 No Default
Accept Oﬀer -c -1 αs − 1
Reject Oﬀer -c -c -c
Where, 0 < c ≤ 1 and −c < 0 < αs − 1 because of αs > 1.
3.4 Information
At date τ = 0, the minimum proportion of required inputs (r), the probability
distribution of firm’s liquid assets at the intermediate date, the level of bank
debt (B) and the aggregate claims by firm’s suppliers (Q) as well as the level of
operating expenses (C) and the cost (c) of selling the goods in the outside market
are common knowledge among agents. We also assume that, as of date τ = 0,
the return
³ eR´ of the firm’s risky project has an improper prior distribution21.
at τ = 1 for every dollar of credit extended by suppliers to the firm at τ = 1.
19 In a similar setting, Rochet and Vives (2001) use a payoﬀ equal to zero assuming that
this is what a fund manager would get for rollovering a credit exposure to an entity that has
subsequently defaulted.
20 In a sample of 178 liquidated firms White (1983) finds that the average payoﬀ rates to
unsecured creditors is approximately 2.5%. Nevertheless, for firms reorganising under Chapter
11 proceedings the payoﬀ rates are above 32%.
21 Improper priors allow the analysis to focus exclusively on agents’ updated beliefs condi-
tional on their private signals, without taking into account the information contained in the
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At τ = 1, creditors receive private noisy signals about the return of the
firm’s risky project. Those signals constitute the only information available to
creditors about the economic value of firm’s investment. Let y be the signal
observed by the bank, which is of the following form:
y = eR+ νε
where, ν > 0 is a constant and ε is a normal random variable with zero measure
and unit variance, density function g (·) and is independent of R. We denote by
G (·) the cumulative distribution function of g (·) . Also at τ = 1 each supplier i
privately observes the following signal:
xi = eR+ σεi
where, σ > 0 is a constant and {εi} are independent, identically distributed
normal random variables with zero measure, unit variance and density func-
tion denoted by f (·). They are also independent of ε. We denote by F (·) the
cumulative distribution function of f (·) .
Rational creditors will use their noisy private signals in order to form be-
liefs about the return
³ eR´ of the firm’s risky project and to infer the beliefs of
other creditors. Thus, a creditor will form beliefs not only about the underlying
fundamentals of the firm, but also about the beliefs of other creditors, other
creditors’ beliefs about other creditors’ beliefs and so on. This is because ra-
tional creditors will realise that their payoﬀs do not only depend on the firm’s
fundamentals, but also on other creditors’ whether or not to restructure.
At τ = 1, the bank moves first and decides whether to increase its leverage
to the firm. It does so conditional on its private signal (y) and taking into
account the eﬀect of its action on suppliers’ behaviour . Suppliers then decide
unilaterally whether to extend credit to the firm by delivering their goods at
τ = 1 for payment at τ = 2. Their actions are conditional upon their private
signals (xi) and the commonly observed action by the bank to extend new credit
to the firm or not. We consider the following definition:
Definition 3 A creditor’s strategy is a rule of action that maps each realization
of its signal to one of two actions: to extend credit to the firm by accepting the
oﬀer, or to reject the oﬀer.
Suppliers strategies are determined at equilibrium by balancing the benefit
of a particular strategy against the opportunity cost of that strategy, taking into
account strategic complementarities. Given that individually they are unable to
influence the solvency of the firm, suppliers fail to account for the eﬀect of their
individual decisions on the completion of firm’s project. Yet, they are able to
account for the eﬀect of their actions as a whole. Thus, they foreclose whenever
prior distribution. In any case, our results with the improper prior can be seen as the limiting
case as the information in the prior density goes to zero. See Hartigan (1983) for a discussion
of improper priors, and Morris and Shin (2000) for a discussion of the latter point.
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the expected benefit (1− c) of doing so is higher than the expected benefit of
extending credit to the firm via the new contract:
Similarly, the bank accepts to provide new credit to the firm if the total
amount it expects to lose from doing so is less than the old loan (B) that it will
definitely lose if it will reject the oﬀer.
Let us suppose that suppliers and the bank follow trigger strategies around
critical signal levels x∗ and y∗ respectively. In case where x∗ and y∗ are uniquely
determined it can be shown that there is a unique, dominance solvable equilib-
rium where suppliers and the bank follow their respective trigger strategies
around x∗ and y∗22.
4 Suppliers’ Equilibrium in Trigger Strategies
Let (R∗) be the critical level of actual investment return below which a propor-
tion of suppliers higher than (1− r) rejects firm’s proposal. We first prove the
following two lemmas.
Lemma 1 Given suppliers’ equilibrium in trigger strategies (x∗), the critical
level of actual investment return (R∗), below which proportion of suppliers less
than r accept the tender oﬀer, is given by: R∗ = x∗ − σF−1 (1− r) .
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 2 If there is no liquidation at the interim date then, conditional on i
supplier’s signal being xi = x∗, the proportion (l∗) of suppliers that receive a
signal lower than x∗ is given by: l∗ = (1−r)2 .
Proof. See Appendix.
Without apology, both for this section and the rest of the paper, we have
assumed that the realised sample distribution of suppliers is always the common
distribution of suppliers’ signals23.
We are ready now to solve for suppliers’ equilibrium in trigger strategies.
4.1 Suppliers’ equilibrium
Conditional on bank’s acceptance to extend new credit to the firm, the critical
value (x∗) of suppliers’ {i} signal solves the following equation:
−cPr
³ eR < R∗ | xi = x∗, y > y∗´−
−Pr
³
R∗ < eR < B +C + as (1− l∗)Q | xi = x∗, y > y∗´+
(as − 1) Pr
³ eR > B +C + as (1− l∗)Q | xi = x∗, y > y∗´ = −c (1)
22 See, for example, Corsetti, C., Dasgupta, A., Morris, S., and H. S. Shin (2001).
23 In lemma (2) for example, one could derive any proportion of suppliers between zero and
(1− r) depending on how he extends the Lebesgue measure.
14
The first term on the LHS of expression (1) corresponds to the situation
where the tender oﬀer is not successful. In that case, suppliers have to sell their
goods elsewhere and face a discount. The second term refers to the situation
where the tender oﬀer succeeds but there is default at τ = 2 because of insuﬃ-
cient proceeds from the project. Finally, the last term on the LHS corresponds
to the situation where the project generates suﬃcient proceeds at τ = 2 to repay
all creditors. On the RHS of (1) there is just the cost that a supplier will face
by refusing to deliver to the firm and by selling his inputs elsewhere.











is such that vσ → 0. As
of Corsetti et al (2001), this is without loss of generality and it is a necessary
assumption in order to keep our analysis tractable.
Proposition 1 If the bank accepts to commit more funds (C) to the financially
distressed firm, conditional on success of the tender oﬀer to small creditors






creditors’ equilibrium in trigger strategies (x∗) is given by:
















then, small creditors’ equilibrium in trigger strate-
gies (x∗) satisfies the following expression:
asF
Ã









where, y∗ is bank’s equilibrium in trigger strategies.
Proof. See Appendix
However, proposition 1 implies that for suﬃciently high minimum tendering





, there is a unique equilibrium in
suppliers’ trigger strategies (x∗), which only depends on the model parameters
and is independent of the strategy (y∗) that is followed by the bank. This
is despite our basic assumption that the relative precision of small claimants’
information relative to that of the bank tends to zero.
The intuition that underlies this result is simple: If a tender oﬀer is subject to
a high minimum tendering rate, both the bank and suppliers know ex ante that,
if the tender oﬀer succeeds, a high proportion of suppliers — meaning, higher
than the already high minimum tendering rate — will have observed relatively
”good” signals. Given that suppliers have nothing to lose from accepting an
oﬀer that fails, conditionality in bank’s acceptance means, in fact, that the
bank accepts to commit more funds to the firm only under the (very) good
state that the tender oﬀer succeeds. Thus, suppliers have nothing substantial
to learn from the bank’s action and, as a result, their equilibrium strategies do
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not depend on the bank’s strategy y∗. In other words, under high minimum
tendering rates, even a bank with a bad signal about the fundamentals of the
project would possibly accept the oﬀer, leaving suppliers to decide, on the basis
of their ”collective wisdom”, whether the project is good or bad. Given that,
in equilibrium, suppliers are aware of that, they recognise that there is clearly
not much (actually nothing) to be learnt from the bank’s action. Interestingly
enough, this is regardless of the bank’s information being infinitely more precise
than their individual signals.






, the information that is entailed in the bank’s action is of value
to suppliers, whose trigger strategies (x∗), then, depend on bank’s equilibrium
strategy (y∗). Taking the equilibrium strategy (y∗) that is followed by the bank,
as given, there is a unique x∗ that solves equation (3). This is shown in the
following figure:
Figure 1: Suppliers’ equilibrium strategy (x∗), given y∗.
In the following section we solve for the bank’s equilibrium in trigger strate-
gies. We show that for a given x∗ there is a uniquely specified critical signal
level (y∗) that determined the bank’s equilibrium strategy. Yet, although there
is an one-to-one relationship between x∗ and y∗, that relationship turns out to











,we prove that equilibria of
the type (x∗, y∗) are not unique.
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5 Bank’s Equilibrium in Trigger Strategies
Conditional on signal y, return
³ eR´ is normally distributed with mean y and
standard deviation v. For our base case where vσ → 0, we consider the following
lemma:
Lemma 3 Provided there is no liquidation at the interim date, and conditional
on signal y = y∗, bank’s belief about proportion lb of suppliers rejecting the







We now turn to solve for the bank’s equilibrium in trigger strategies. We
focus on the limiting case where vσ → 0.
5.1 Bank’s equilibrium
Given that rejection by the bank would result in default by the firm and the
bank would lose the original loan amount (B), bank’s trigger point (y∗) solves
the following equation:
−B Pr
³ eR < R∗ | y = y∗´−DPr³R∗ < eR < B +C + αs ¡1− lb¢Q | y = y∗´ = −B
(4)
where, D ≡ LGD× (B +C) and, from section 3.2, LGD > BB+C .
The first term on the LHS of (4)captures the conditional feature of bank’s
acceptance; should, the bank agree to provide a new loan (C), but proportion of
suppliers higher than the critical level (1− r) rejects the oﬀer, there is immediate
default and the bank loses only the original loan amount (B). The second term
captures the bank loss at the ’bad’ situation where the bank losses more than B
because of default at τ = 2 and the additional credit (C) it extended at τ = 1.
In case of no-default at τ = 2 the bank loses nothing. Should, however, the bank
refuse to extend a new loan then it bears a certain loss of −B, which appears
on the RHS of equation (4).
Proposition 2 Given small creditors’ equilibrium in trigger strategies x∗, if
bank’s acceptance to commit more funds (C) to the financially distressed firm
is made conditional upon success of the tender oﬀer to small creditors with
minimum tendering rate r then, bank’s equilibrium in trigger strategies (y∗) is
given by:
















and D ≡ LGD×(B+C) and, from
section 3.2, the loss-given-default (LGD) is such that LGD > BB+C .
Proof. See Appendix
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From equation (5) we see that the higher the required amount of extra credit
(C) and the higher the loss-given-default (LGD) that is associated with default
at τ = 2, the higher the bank’s critical signal level y∗. Furthermore, the critical
signal level y∗ increases proportionately to the face value (αs) of the new claims
that are oﬀered to the suppliers.
Equilibrium strategies by suppliers (x∗) and by the bank (y∗) can then be
calculated by simultaneously solving equations (2) and (5), as well as equations






, there is a uniquely determined suppliers’ equilibrium
(x∗) that depends only on the model parameters. By substituting that x∗ from
equation (2) into (5), and from the monotonicity of F (·), we derive a unique
equilibrium in trigger strategies by the bank (y∗), as illustrated in the following
figure:
Figure 2: Bank’s equilibrium strategy (y∗) for high r.











from equations (3) into (5) and we derive the following
expression:





x∗ − (B +C)− as (1+r)2 Q
σ
!













in trigger strategies (y∗) is defined as a strictly decreasing function of small
creditors’ equilibrium in trigger strategies (x∗). In other words, if one class of
creditors attains a high equilibrium trigger strategies then, this is perceived as
”good news” to the other class of creditors, which then chooses a low equilibrium





, or y∗ > x∗ + σF−1 (r), and vice
versa. This proves the following result:
Theorem 1 If bank’s acceptance to participate in the resolution of financial
distress is made conditional upon success of a tender oﬀer to small creditors
with minimum tendering rate r, and if small creditors’ equilibrium in trigger






there are multiple equilibria in trigger strategies (x∗, y∗).
A graphical representation of theorem 1 is shown in the following figure:
Figure 3: Multiple equilibria (x∗, y∗) for low r (bold line).






of equilibria of the type (x∗, y∗) is the bold curve in figure 3. Nevertheless, in
the following section we prove that all those equilibria are Pareto improving of
a unique equilibrium in small claimants’ strategies that we derive with no bank
in the game.
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5.2 No Bank in the Game
Let us now think of a situation where at date τ = 0 a bank extends a senior and
unsecured loan to the firm of total amount B
0
= B+C for repayment at τ = 2
and the fixed operating cost (C) is incurred at τ = 0 (e.g. labour and other
costs are paid up front). In that case, and similar to the above scenario where
the bank provides a new loan at the intermediate date, suppliers who agree to






We assume, as previously, that suppliers follow trigger strategies around a
critical signal level (x∗∗). There is no reason to expect x∗∗ to be the same as
x∗ given than now suppliers are not able to learn from the action of the bank.
Our objective is to compare x∗∗ with x∗. The critical signal level (x∗∗) in that
case solves the following equation:
−cPr (R < R∗∗ | xi = x∗∗)−
−Pr (R∗∗ < R < B0 + asQ (1− l∗∗) | xi = x∗∗)+
(as − 1)Pr (R > B0 + asQ (1− l∗∗) | xi = x∗∗) = −c (7)
where, B0 = B + C, R∗∗ is defined as in lemma (1) and l∗∗ is defined as in
lemma (2).
Proposition 3 If there was no bank in the game then, under minimum ten-
dering rate r, small creditors’ equilibrium in trigger strategies (x∗∗) is given
by:












From equation (8), the critical signal level x∗∗ is increasing in (B +C) and
Q (the leverage factors), and decreasing in c. The eﬀects of as and r are am-
biguous. It is worth noting that the sum of the first and second term on the
RHS of (8) correspond to the representative-agent case where there is no strate-
gic uncertainty about other agents’ actions, while the third term corresponds
to the strategic uncertainty premium, which can be either positive or negative
depending on model parameters.
In particular, for minimum tendering rates (r) such that r ≤ 2(1−c)−as2(1−c) the
strategic uncertainty premium is positive, otherwise it is negative, in which case
we refer to it as a strategic-uncertainty discount. In the latter case, strategic
agents rely substantially on what a successful tender oﬀer implies with respect
to the collective knowledge of other agents. Thus, they are ready to accept a
discount in their signals before dropping an oﬀer, given that they have nothing
to lose by accepting an oﬀer that subsequently fails (i.e. the minimum tendering
rate is not met).
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Finally, from equations (2) and (8) we observe that suppliers’ equilibrium
strategy x∗∗ is the same as if there was a bank in the game and the minimum
tendering rate (r) was relatively high. We are now ready to prove the following
proposition:
Proposition 4 If a bank accepts to participate in the resolution of financial
distress of a debtor, and it does so conditional upon success of a tender oﬀer
to small creditors with minimum tendering rate r then, the equilibrium in small
creditors’ trigger strategies (x∗) is such that x∗ ≤ x∗∗, where equality holds






the equilibrium in bank’s trigger strategies and x∗∗ is the equilibrium in small
creditors’ trigger strategies when the bank is not in the game.
Proof. See Appendix.
The following corollary results immediately from proposition 4.






, acceptance by a bank to commit more funds to a financially dis-
tressed firm leads to contract revision oﬀers becoming successful at a lower level
of firm’s fundamentals (R∗) compared to the situation with no bank involvement
(R∗∗).
Proof. It follows immediately from proposition 4 and the fact that R∗∗ =
x∗∗ − σF−1 (1− r) and R∗ = x∗ − σF−1 (1− r).
Proposition 4 and corollary 1 imply that, controlling for money-eﬀects, a
bank’s involvement in the resolution of financial distress of a debtor may induce
small creditors to accept contract revision oﬀers more easily, which is consistent
with empirical evidence. As a result, a bank’s involvement in debt restructuring
may lead to lower deadweight costs of ineﬃcient liquidation compared to the
situation with no bank in the game. However, the results also suggest that if a
bank’s acceptance is made conditional upon relatively high minimum tendering
rates by other creditors then, small creditors’ equilibrium strategies turn out
to be the same as if no bank was in the game. This is, excessive conditional-
ity in bank’s acceptance may negate the positive information externality of its
involvement on other creditors.
6 Concluding Remarks
We developed a model of financial distress consistent with institutional char-
acteristics of out-of-court renegotiation of a firm’s contractual obligations. We
investigated the extent to which acceptance by a well informed bank creditor to
commit further to the financially distressed firm (i.e. via a new loan) facilitates
contract revision oﬀers that are made by the firm to a diﬀuse set of claimants.
Our results are consistent with empirical evidence, which suggests that banks
play a potentially important role in facilitating the resolution of financial dis-
tress. In particular, when a bank participates in the debt restructuring, contract
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revision oﬀers become successful at lower values of the firm’s fundamentals com-
pared to the situation where the bank has no role to play in the restructuring.
In that sense, involvement by a bank in a debt restructuring reduces the extent
of ineﬃcient liquidation due to potential co-ordination problems among credi-
tors. However, the analysis suggests that excessive conditionality in the bank’s
acceptance to commit more funds to a financially distressed firm may negate the
positive information externality of bank’s acceptance on other creditors’ actions.
This is proved in proposition (4).
By drawing a parallel between the simple balance sheet of the financially dis-
tressed firm in our model, and the capital account of a country during the onset
of a financial crisis, we may discuss possible implications of our analysis on the
doctrine of catalytic finance regarding the resolution of an international financial
crisis. That doctrine rests on the premise that, ”under the right conditions”,
oﬃcial assistance and private sector funding are strategic complements”24. Un-
til before the Argentine crisis in 2001, the doctrine of catalytic finance was the
cornerstone of the oﬃcial community’s strategy towards capital account crisis25.
The main idea was that oﬃcial assistance to a country that experiences a liq-
uidity crisis could encourage other creditors to act in a way that mitigates the
crisis. Since the Argentine default, the doctrine of catalytic finance is less ap-
pealing among the G7. In particular, with respect to IMF interventions, there
are voices nowadays arguing that the IMF’s assistance to a country is exploited
by private creditors and, in a sense, the two sources of funding become strategic
substitutes during periods of financial crisis, rather than complements. Those
voices are further reinforced by a moral-hazard story, according to which, the
inability of the IMF to commit not always to intervene exacerbates the moral
hazard problem on the part of the debtor country.
Given that our analysis relates to the work-outs of financial distress, rather
than to the prevention of financial crisis, we could set aside the moral-hazard
issue and conclude our discussion by noting the following: First, the presumption
that underlies the doctrine of catalytic finance, namely, that oﬃcial assistance
to a country in financial crisis could encourage other creditors to act in a way
that induces a more eﬃcient resolution of the crisis, is in line with our result
that the appropriate involvement of a large creditor may alleviate ineﬃciencies
that possibly arise from co-ordination problems among creditors. Second, our
analysis indicates that excessive conditionality, in a large creditor’s acceptance
of a restructuring oﬀer, could work against the eﬀectiveness of catalytic finance.
In our model, that conditionality was captured through the minimum tendering
rate. But it can also take other forms, such as assignment of preferred creditor
status (PCS) to a large creditor, high tendering rates in collective action clauses
(CACs) etc. But, it can also be the case that some degree of conditionality may
permit creditors to make better informed decisions by allowing them to base
their actions on the collective knowledge of other creditors. Thus, we may
24See Morris and Shin (2003) for an elaborate analysis on catalytic finance..
25The September 2000 communique of the International Monetary and Finance Committee
states that ”the combination of catalytic oﬃcial financing and policy adjustment should allow
the country to regain full market access quickly” .
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7.1 Proof of Lemma1
Conditional on actual investment return (R), signal xi is normally distributed
with mean R and variance σ2. Given that suppliers’ signals {xi} are iid, the
critical level of investment return (R∗), below which rejection by suppliers gen-
erates default, is such that:









R∗ = x∗ − σF−1 (1− r)
which proves the lemma.
7.2 Proof of Lemma2
Given that suppliers’ signals are iid, conditional on no default at τ = 1 (i.e.
R > R∗) and on signal xi, i supplier’s belief about the proportion (l) of other
suppliers receiving a signal lower than his is defined as follows:
l = Pr (xj < xi | R > R∗) (9)
For xi = x∗ equation (9) gives the rejection rate (l∗) that one expects to occur
when he observes a signal equal to the critical signal level (x∗) :
l∗ = Pr (xj < x∗ | R > R∗) =
=
Pr (xj < x
∗, R > R∗)
Pr (R > R∗)
(10)
Conditional on signal xi = x∗, signal xj is normal with mean x∗ and vari-
ance 2σ2. Similarly (R) is also normal with mean x∗ and variance σ2. More-
over, conditional on xi = x∗, xj and R are correlated with covariance equal
to σ2. Thus, (xj , R) is a bivariate normal distribution with mean µ =(x∗, x∗)
0





. From the definition of the





















By changing the order of integration in equation (11) and by applying the trans-







































−F−1(1−r) F (−w) f (w) dw
1− r












which proves the lemma.
7.3 Proof of Proposition1
From equation (1) and using lemmas 1 and 2, we set R∗ = x∗ − σF−1 (1− r),





















σ < εi < F





















εi − vσ ε < x
∗−y∗
σ
¢ = −c (12)
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¢ = −c (13)
We consider two cases: 1) F−1 (1− r) < (x∗−y∗)σ 2) F−1 (1− r) > (x
∗−y∗)
σ .




































(1− r) (1− c)
as
¸
which proves equation (2).


































which proves equation (3) and completes the proof of the proposition.
7.4 Proof of Lemma 3





of suppliers that receive a signal lower than x∗ (i.e.
reject firm’s oﬀer) is defined as follows:
lb = Pr (xj < x
∗ | R > R∗, y = y∗) =
29
=
Pr (xj < x
∗, R > R∗)
Pr (R > R∗)
(15)
Conditional on y = y∗ signal xj is normally distributed with mean y∗ and vari-
ance v2 + σ2. Similarly, return R is also normal with mean y∗ and variance
v2. Moreover, xj and R are correlated with covariance v2. Thus, conditional on
y∗, (xj , R) is a bivariate normal distribution with mean µ =(y∗, y∗)
0
and vari-
ance/covariance matrix Σ =
·
v2 + σ2 v2
v2 v2
¸
. From the definition of the mul-
tivariate normal distribution and the fact that Σ−1 = 1v2σ2
·
v2 −v2
−v2 v2 + σ2
¸


















Pr (y∗ − vε > x∗ − σF−1 (1− r)) (16)
By changing the order of integration in equation (16) and by applying the trans-



















































Let w = R−y
∗









































−1 (1− r)¤ (17)
Equation (17) can be simplified a lot by considering the limiting case where
v







which proves the lemma.
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7.5 Proof of Proposition2
By substituting R∗ from lemma (1) into equation (4) and expressing eR in terms
























The critical signal levels x∗ and y∗ are found by solving simultaneously
equations (12) and (19). Obviously neither of these equations can be solved
in closed form in the general case, though they can be solved numerically. We























which proves the proposition.
7.6 Proof of Proposition 3
By substituting R∗∗ = x∗∗ − σF−1 (1− r) and l∗∗ = (1−r)2 in equation (7) we
get the following equation:
−c+ c (1− r)− (1− r) + asF
Ã


















= (1− c) (1− r) (20)
or











which proves the proposition.
7.7 Proof of Proposition 4





, namely F−1 (1− r) > x∗−y∗σ , a
small claimants’ critical signal level (x∗) satisfies the following expression:
asF
Ã














If there was no bank in the game then, from proposition (3) we know that a
small claimants’ critical signal level (x∗∗) solves the following equation:
asF
Ã







= (1− c) (1− r) (23)





< (1− r), equations (22) and (23)
imply the following inequality:
F
Ã

















From the monotonicity of F (·), inequality (24) holds if and only if x∗ < x∗∗.





, propositions 1 and 3 imply that x∗ = x∗∗, which completes
the proof of the proposition.
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